



Family Name:

First Name:

Section:

Advanced Cryptography

Midterm Exam Solution

April 28th, 2009

Duration: 3 hours 45 minutes

This document consists of 14 pages.

Instructions

Electronic devices are *not* allowed.

All printed documents are permitted.

Answers must be written on the exercises sheet.

This exam contains 4 *independent* exercises.

Answers can be either in French or English.

Questions of any kind will certainly *not* be answered.

Potential errors in these sheets are part of the exam.

You have to put your full name on the first page and have all pages *stapled*.

1 RSA Public-Key Recovery

Given an integer e and a few (x_i, y_i) pairs such that $y_i = x_i^e \pmod N$ for some unknown common N of known bit-length ℓ , we consider the problem of recovering N . We assume that $0 \leq x_i, y_i < N$ and that i ranges from 1 to n .

- Using Buffon's needle problem we can show that the probability that two independent uniformly distributed integers in $\{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\}$ are coprime tends towards $\frac{6}{\pi^2}$ as ℓ goes to infinity.

We take independent uniformly distributed integers X_1, \dots, X_n in $\{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\}$. Show that the probability that $\gcd(X_1, \dots, X_n) > 1$ is less than $(1 - \frac{6}{\pi^2})^{\frac{n}{2}}$ as ℓ goes to infinity.

Hint: consider $\frac{n}{2}$ disjoint pairs of form (X_{2i-1}, X_{2i}) .

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Let } \mathcal{S} = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\} \\
 & \lim_{\ell \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_{X_1, X_2 \in \mathcal{S}} [\gcd(X_1, X_2) = 1] = \frac{6}{\pi^2} \\
 & \iff \lim_{\ell \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_{X_1, X_2 \in \mathcal{S}} [\gcd(X_1, X_2) > 1] = 1 - \frac{6}{\pi^2} \\
 & \lim_{\ell \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_{X_1, \dots, X_n \in \mathcal{S}} [\gcd(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) > 1] \\
 & \leq \lim_{\ell \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_{X_{2i-1}, X_{2i} \in \mathcal{S}} [\gcd(X_1, X_2) > 1, \gcd(X_3, X_4) > 1, \dots, \gcd(X_{n-1}, X_n) > 1] \\
 & \leq \lim_{\ell \rightarrow \infty} \prod_{i=1}^{n/2} \Pr_{X_{2i-1}, X_{2i} \in \mathcal{S}} [\gcd(X_{2i-1}, X_{2i}) > 1] \\
 & \leq \prod_{i=1}^{n/2} \lim_{\ell \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_{X_{2i-1}, X_{2i} \in \mathcal{S}} [\gcd(X_{2i-1}, X_{2i}) > 1] \leq \prod_{i=1}^{n/2} \left(1 - \frac{6}{\pi^2}\right) = \left(1 - \frac{6}{\pi^2}\right)^{n/2}
 \end{aligned}$$

- We now take independent random integers X_1, \dots, X_n which are uniformly distributed among the set of all multiples of N in $\{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\}$. Show that $\gcd(X_1, \dots, X_n) = N$ except with negligible probability as n increases.

$$\begin{aligned}
 & X_i = k_i N, \quad k_i \in \mathcal{S} = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\} \\
 & \gcd(X_1, \dots, X_n) = \gcd(k_1 N, \dots, k_n N) = N \cdot \gcd(k_1, \dots, k_n)
 \end{aligned}$$

From the previous question we know that:

$$\lim_{\ell \rightarrow \infty} \Pr_{k_1, \dots, k_n \in \mathcal{S}} [\gcd(k_1, \dots, k_n) > 1] \leq \left(1 - \frac{6}{\pi^2}\right)^{n/2}$$

When n increases this probability decreases. Hence $\gcd(k_1, \dots, k_n) = 1$ except with negligible probability, which means that $\gcd(X_1, \dots, X_n) = N$ except with negligible probability as n increases.

3. Deduce that we can recover N by computing $\gcd(x_1^e - y_1, \dots, x_n^e - y_n)$. What is its complexity in terms of ℓ , e , and n ?

$$x_i^e \bmod N = y_i \text{ and } 0 \leq x_i, y_i < N$$

Hence we can write $x_i^e - y_i = k_i N$

$$\gcd(x_1^e - y_1, \dots, x_n^e - y_n) = \gcd(k_1 N, \dots, k_n N) = N \cdot \gcd(k_1, \dots, k_n)$$

From the previous question we can conclude that $\gcd(x_1^e - y_1, \dots, x_n^e - y_n) = N$ except with negligible probability.

The complexity to compute this \gcd can be divided in three parts:

First there is n exponentiation to compute: $O(n \cdot e \cdot l^2 \cdot \log e)$

Then there is n subtraction to do: $O(n \cdot l)$

And finally there is the \gcd to do between n elements: $O(n \cdot e^2 \cdot l^2)$

Hence the overall computation is $O(n \cdot e^2 \cdot l^2 \cdot \log e)$

2 DP and LP Tricks

Consider a function f from $A = \{0, 1\}^p$ to $B = \{0, 1\}^q$. We define DP^f and LP^f as functions from $A \times B$ to \mathbf{R} as usual by

$$\begin{aligned}\text{DP}^f(a, b) &= \Pr_X[f(a \oplus X) \oplus f(X) = b] \\ \text{LP}^f(a, b) &= \left(2 \Pr_X[a \cdot X = b \cdot f(X)] - 1\right)^2\end{aligned}$$

1. Show that for any $b \neq 0$ we have $\text{DP}^f(0, b) = 0$. Give a necessary and sufficient condition about f so that

$$\forall a \neq 0 \quad \text{DP}^f(a, 0) = 0$$

$$\forall b \neq 0, \text{DP}^f(0, b) = \Pr_X[f(X) \oplus f(X) = b] = \Pr_X[b = 0] = 0$$

$$\text{Note that } \text{DP}^f(a, 0) = \Pr_X[f(a \oplus X) \oplus f(X) = 0] = \Pr_X[f(a \oplus X) = f(X)]$$

$$\forall a \neq 0 \quad \text{DP}^f(a, 0) = \Pr_X[f(a \oplus X) = f(X)] = 0 \iff \forall X, \forall a \neq 0 \quad f(a \oplus X) \neq f(X)$$

$$\text{Moreover } a \neq 0 \iff a \oplus X \neq X \iff \forall X, Y \quad X \neq Y$$

Hence f is injective.

2. Show that for any $a \neq 0$ we have $\text{LP}^f(a, 0) = 0$.

$$\forall a \neq 0 \quad \text{LP}^f(a, 0) = \left(2 \Pr_X[a \cdot X = 0] - 1\right)^2$$

$$\Pr_X[a \cdot X = 0] = \Pr_{X_1, \dots, X_p}[a_1 X_1 \oplus \dots \oplus a_p X_p = 0] = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Rightarrow \forall a \neq 0 \quad \text{LP}^f(a, 0) = \left(2 \cdot \frac{1}{2} - 1\right)^2 = 0$$

3. We define a function g from B to \mathbf{R} by $g(y) = \Pr[f(X) = y]$ for all $y \in B$ where X is uniformly distributed in A . Show that for any function h we have

$$E(h(f(X))) = 2^q \cdot E(g(Y)h(Y))$$

where Y is uniformly distributed in B and where $E(X)$ is the expected value of the random variable X .

Recall: $E(X) = \sum_x x \Pr[X = x]$; and $E(f(X)) = \sum_x f(x) \Pr[X = x]$

$$\begin{aligned} E(h(f(X))) &= \sum_x h(f(x)) \Pr[X = x] \\ &= 2^q \sum_y h(y) \Pr[f(X) = y] \Pr[Y = y] \\ &= 2^q \sum_y h(y) g(y) \Pr[Y = y] \\ &= 2^q E(g(Y)h(Y)) \end{aligned}$$

4. Deduce that

$$\text{LP}^f(0, b) = 2^{2q} \left(E \left(g(Y)(-1)^{b \cdot Y} \right) \right)^2$$

where Y is uniformly distributed in B .

Recall: $\text{LP}^f(a, b) = \left(E \left((-1)^{a \cdot X \oplus b \cdot f(x)} \right) \right)^2$

Hence $\text{LP}^f(0, b) = \left(E \left((-1)^{b \cdot f(x)} \right) \right)^2$

Let $h(y) = (-1)^{b \cdot y}$ then from the previous question we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LP}^f(0, b) &= (E(h(f(X))))^2 \\ &= (2^q E(g(Y)h(Y)))^2 \\ &= 2^{2q} \left(E \left(g(Y)(-1)^{b \cdot Y} \right) \right)^2 \end{aligned}$$

5. Show that

$$g(y) = 2^{-q} \sum_{b \in B} (-1)^{b \cdot y} E \left((-1)^{b \cdot f(X)} \right)$$

where X is uniformly distributed in A .

$$\begin{aligned} 2^{-q} \sum_{b \in B} (-1)^{b \cdot y} E \left((-1)^{b \cdot f(X)} \right) &= \sum_{b \in B} (-1)^{b \cdot y} E \left(g(Y) (-1)^{b \cdot Y} \right) \\ &= E \left(\sum_{b \in B} (-1)^{b \cdot y} g(Y) (-1)^{b \cdot Y} \right) \\ &= E \left(g(Y) \sum_{b \in B} (-1)^{b \cdot (y+Y)} \right) \\ &= E \left(g(Y) 2^q 1_{Y=y} \right) \\ &= 2^q E \left(g(y) 1_{Y=y} \right) = g(y) \end{aligned}$$

6. Deduce that

$$\forall b \neq 0 \quad \text{LP}^f(0, b) = 0$$

if and only if $g(y) = 2^{-q}$ for all $y \in B$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{If } \forall b \neq 0 \quad \text{LP}^f(0, b) = 0 &\Rightarrow \forall b \neq 0 \quad E \left((-1)^{b \cdot f(x)} \right) = 0 \text{ (from question 4)} \\ &\Rightarrow g(y) = 2^{-q} \text{ for all } y \in B \text{ (from question 5)} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Conversely, if } \forall y \in B \quad g(y) = 2^{-q} &\Rightarrow \forall b \neq 0 \quad E \left(g(Y) (-1)^{b \cdot Y} \right) = 0 \\ &\Rightarrow \forall b \neq 0 \quad \text{LP}^f(0, b) = 0 \text{ (from question 4)} \end{aligned}$$

7. Deduce that

$$\forall b \neq 0 \quad \text{LP}^f(0, b) = 0$$

if and only if f is balanced, i.e. all elements in B are equally taken as images by f .

$$\forall b \neq 0 \quad \text{LP}^f(0, b) = 0$$

$$\iff \forall y \in B \quad g(y) = \Pr[f(X) = y] = \frac{1}{2^q} \text{ (from question 6)}$$

$$\iff \text{All elements in } B \text{ are equally taken as images by } f$$

$$\iff f \text{ is balanced.}$$

3 Applied Crypto-polymorphism

The CONFIKER worm is permanently updating itself by looking for updates over the Internet. Once it has found the update, it checks if the update code has a correct RSA signature with modulus N and public exponent e . One problem is that the value of N in the code of the worm is large enough to be used by anti-virus software to detect the presence of the worm. The worm concealer attended to a lecture on cryptography and would like to obfuscate N using cryptographic tricks.

1. Recall how the RSA signature verification works for a message m with signature σ .
(Assume for example PKCS#1v1.5 with deterministic formatting rules for m .)

RSA signature public key: (e, N)
RSA signature secret key: (d, N)
 $\sigma = \text{format}(m)^d \pmod N$, where $\text{format}(m) = 0100FF \cdots FF00 || h(m)$
 $\Rightarrow \sigma^e \pmod N = \text{format}m$

2. Once the worm installs, it picks a random prime number p , computes $N' = pN$ and discards p and N . The value of N' remains in the worm code. Show that a signature σ of an update code m can still be verified using e and N' instead of e and N .

Can an anti-virus software detect the presence of the RSA key?

The standard method for signature verification is to verify the following equality:
 $(\sigma^e - \text{format}(m)) \pmod N = 0$. However the value of N has been discarded.

We know that:

$\sigma^e \pmod N = \text{format}(m)$
 $\Rightarrow N \mid ((\sigma^e \pmod{N'}) - \text{format}(m))$
 $\Rightarrow \text{gcd}((\sigma^e \pmod{N'}) - \text{format}(m), N') > 1$
and this latter property is exceptional as N' only has 3 big prime factors.

3. Assume that the anti-virus software conceptr has analyzed the code of the worm on two independent infected machines and extracted N'_1 and N'_2 . Show that he can deduce the value of N .

With the value of N , show that we can still detect the presence of the worm based on the value of N' in the code. (Assume that N' can easily be extracted from the code.)

$$N'_1 = p_1N, \quad N'_2 = p_2N \quad \text{If } \gcd(p_1, p_2) = 1 \Rightarrow \gcd(N'_1, N'_2) = N$$

Detection is done by verifying the following equality: $\gcd(N', N) = N$.

4 Distinguishing Sources

We consider a source producing iid random variables $X_i \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\}$ for $i = 1, \dots, q$. For this, we consider two distributions:

- the uniform distribution P_0
- the distribution P_1 induced by $X_i = Y_i \bmod 2^\ell$ where Y_i is uniformly distributed in $\{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$ and $p > 2^\ell$. (Note that P_0 can be considered as a particular case of P_1 with $p = 2^\ell$.)

We assume that ℓ is large, e.g. $\ell \geq 80$ and we let $r = p \bmod 2^\ell$.

1. Given $x \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\}$, show that

$$P_1(x) = \begin{cases} \left(1 - \frac{r}{p}\right) 2^{-\ell} + \frac{1}{p} & \text{if } x < r \\ \left(1 - \frac{r}{p}\right) 2^{-\ell} & \text{if } x \geq r. \end{cases}$$

P_0 uniform over $\{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\}$
 $P_1 = (\text{uniform over } \{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}) \bmod 2^\ell$

$p \bmod 2^\ell = r \Rightarrow p = r + n2^\ell \iff n = (p - r)2^{-\ell}$

$$P_1(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{n+1}{p} = \left(1 - \frac{r}{p}\right) 2^{-\ell} + \frac{1}{p} & \text{if } x < r \\ \frac{n}{p} = \left(1 - \frac{r}{p}\right) 2^{-\ell} & \text{if } x \geq r. \end{cases}$$

2. Describe a distinguisher using $q = 1$ which achieves the optimal advantage.

Recall that $P_0(x) = 2^{-\ell}$

$$\frac{P_0(x)}{P_1(x)} = \begin{cases} < 1 & \text{if } x < r \\ \geq 1 & \text{if } x \geq r. \end{cases}$$

Hence if $x < r$ answer 1, else answer 0.

3. For $q = 1$, what is the best advantage for distinguishing P_0 from P_1 ? Express it as a formula in terms of ℓ , p , and r .

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Adv} &= \frac{1}{2} \sum_x |P_0(x) - P_1(x)| \\
 &= \frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{x < r} \left| \frac{r}{p} 2^{-\ell} - \frac{1}{p} \right| + \sum_{x \geq r} \left| \frac{r}{p} 2^{-\ell} \right| \right) \\
 &= \frac{1}{2p} \left(r(1 - r2^{-\ell}) + (2^\ell - r)r2^{-\ell} \right) \\
 &= \frac{r}{2p} \left((1 - r2^{-\ell}) + (2^\ell - r)2^{-\ell} \right) \\
 &= \frac{r}{2p} \left((1 - r2^{-\ell}) + (1 - r2^{-\ell}) \right) \\
 &= \frac{r}{p} \left(1 - r2^{-\ell} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

4. Deduce that for $p \leq c2^\ell$ with c small and $r2^{-\ell}$ neither too small nor too close to 1, then P_0 and P_1 can be distinguished using a single sample.

$$\text{Adv} = \frac{r}{p} (1 - r2^{-\ell}) = \frac{2^\ell}{p} \cdot r2^{-\ell} \cdot (1 - r2^{-\ell})$$

As $\frac{2^\ell}{p} \geq \frac{1}{c}$ is non negligible, and so are $r2^{-\ell}$ and $(1 - r2^{-\ell})$, a single sample can be used to distinguish P_0 from P_1 .

5. Describe a distinguisher using an arbitrarily fixed q which achieves the optimal advantage.

The best distinguisher using multiple samples (q samples) will have as parameter R the following:

$$R = \frac{2^{-q\ell}}{\left(\left(1 - \frac{r}{p}\right)2^{-\ell} + \frac{1}{p}\right)^{\#\{i:x_i < r\}} \left(\left(1 - \frac{r}{p}\right)2^{-\ell}\right)^{q - \#\{i:x_i < r\}}}$$

The best distinguisher will thus simply compare R and 1.

6. Compute the squared Euclidean distance between P_0 and P_1 .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SEI}(P_0, P_1) &= 2^\ell \sum_x |P_0(x) - P_1(x)|^2 \\ &= 2^\ell \left(\sum_{x < r} \left(\frac{r}{p} 2^{-\ell} - \frac{1}{p} \right)^2 + \sum_{x \geq r} \left(\frac{r}{p} 2^{-\ell} \right)^2 \right) \\ &= 2^\ell \left(r \left(\frac{r}{p} 2^{-\ell} \right)^2 - 2 \frac{r^2}{p^2} 2^{-\ell} + \frac{r}{p^2} + (2^\ell - r) \left(\frac{r}{p} 2^{-\ell} \right)^2 \right) \\ &= 2^\ell \left(\frac{-r^2}{p^2} 2^{-\ell} + \frac{r}{p^2} \right) \\ &= 2^\ell \frac{r}{p^2} (1 - r 2^{-\ell}) \end{aligned}$$

7. Assuming that P_1 is close to P_0 , approximate the Chernoff information between P_0 and P_1 . Deduce that $C(P_0, P_1) \leq \frac{2^\ell}{2p \ln 2}$ whatever r .

$$\begin{aligned}
 C(P_0, P_1) &= \frac{\text{SEI}(P_0, P_1)}{8 \ln 2} = \frac{1}{8 \ln 2} \cdot \frac{r}{p^2} 2^\ell (1 - r 2^{-\ell}) \\
 &= \frac{2^\ell}{2p \ln 2} \cdot \frac{r}{4p} \cdot (1 - r 2^{-\ell}) \\
 &\leq \frac{2^\ell}{2p \ln 2}
 \end{aligned}$$

8. Deduce that for p larger than 2^{2^ℓ} the two distributions are indistinguishable in practice.

$$p > 2^{2^\ell} \Rightarrow C(P_0, P_1) \leq \frac{2^\ell}{2p \ln 2} < \frac{2^\ell}{2 \cdot 2^{2^\ell} \ln 2} \Rightarrow C(P_0, P_1) < \frac{1}{2^{\ell+1} \ln 2} < \frac{1}{2^\ell}$$

We need at least $2^{\ell+1} \ln 2$ samples which is more than 2^ℓ samples.

Any attempt to look at
the content of these pages
before the signal
will be severely punished.

Please be patient.