

Family Name:
First Name:
Section:

## Security and Cryptography

Fall semester 2007

### Midterm Exam

November 1<sup>st</sup>, 2007

Duration: 105 minutes

Part 1 / 2

This document consists of 8 pages.

#### Instructions

Documents are *not* allowed apart from linguistic dictionaries.

Electronic devices are *not* allowed.

Answers must be written on the exercises sheet.

This exam contains 2 independent exercises.

Answers can be either in French or English.

Questions of any kind will certainly not be answered. Potential errors in these sheets are part of the exam.

You have to put your full name on the first page and have all pages stapled.

### 1 Attacks on a Simple Cipher

Let  $C: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^m \mapsto \{0,1\}^n$  be a *n*-bit block cipher with *m*-bit keys. C consists of 2 rounds of a Feistel scheme as depicted on Figure 1. The plaintext is denoted by  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  and the output ciphertext by  $y \in \{0,1\}^n$ .




Figure 1: C: a 2-round Feistel scheme.

We use the notation  $x_\ell, x_r \in \{0,1\}^{\frac{n}{2}}$  (resp.  $y_\ell, y_r \in \{0,1\}^{\frac{n}{2}}$ ) for the plaintext (resp. ciphertext) on the left and right leaves, i.e.,  $x = x_\ell \|x_r$  and  $y = y_\ell \|y_r$  where the operator " $\|$ " denotes the concatenation.

Now, we will define the round functions. Let the key  $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ , i.e. here m=n, and let  $k_1, k_2 \in \{0,1\}^{\frac{n}{2}}$  be respectively the left and right part of k. We consider that the round function  $F_i$  with input  $\alpha$  simply "xor" the input with the round key  $k_i$ , i.e. the output is

$$\beta = F_i(\alpha) = \alpha \oplus k_i.$$

2.	Write $y_{\ell}$ and $y_r$ in terms of $x_{\ell}, x_r, k_1, k_2$ .
3.	Explain how it is possible to recover the key $K$ using one plaintext-attack query, i.e. based on a plaintext-ciphertext pair $(x, y)$ .
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Now, we use C from Figure 1 to build the cipher 2C. 2C is built by concatenating two times C as decpited on Figure 2.




Figure 2: 2C.

4. Considering $C$ as a black-box, which well-known attack can be applied?
5. Write $y_{\ell}$ and $y_r$ in terms of $x_{\ell}, x_r, k_{a1}, k_{a2}, k_{b1}, k_{b2}$ .

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# 2 Linear Algebra

	1. Compute $17^{129} \mod 19$ .  Give the details.	
Γ	Give the details.	
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2.	Compute the inverse of 7 in $\mathbb{Z}_{143}^*$ , i.e. compute $7^{-1}$ mod 143. Give the details.

Any attempt to look at the content of these pages before the signal will be severly punished.

Please be patient.